2. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If S and T are bargaining problems such that r contains 5', and i f / ( 7 ' ) e 5 , then/(r) =/(S).
3. Symmetry. If S is symmetric (i.e., if (JCJ, X 2 ) G 5 ' implies (^3, Xj) e 5) then 4-Pareto Optimality. If jt is a point in S and there exists a p o i n t / in S such that (>'i'>'2) > (-^P ^^2)^ ^hen X i= f(Sy Nash proved the following. The requirement that a solution be Pareto optimal may be thought of as a requirement of collective rationality, since it states that an outcome may not be chosen if there is another outcome which both players agree is preferable. In what follows, we show that the Nash solution may be obtained from a requirement of individual rationality, in place of Pareto optimality. individual rationahty is generally considered to be a more elementary requirement than collective rationality.T he form'' of individual rationality which we shall require is the following. 5. Individual Rationality./(5') > (0. 0). The central result of this paper can now be stated. Note that Condition 5 says that the solution will always pick a point in the nonnegative quadrant of the plane. So Condition 2 implies that we need only consider the nonnegative part of any bargaining problem. For simplicity we shall henceforth consider only sets S which are contained in the nonnegative quadrant.
It will be useful in the proof to define the strict Pareto surface of a set S to be the set of elements x of 5 for which no element y of S exists such that y T^ X and (y^, Vj) > (X|, X2). The proof proceeds via the following.
LEMMA. If f obeys Conditions I, 2 and 5, then f(S) is an element of the strict Pareto surface of S.
PROOF. Consider a bargaining problem 5 (i.e., 5 ts a compact convex subset of the nonnegative quadrant which contains the origin). Let 7"= {(.v,. x^ > (0, 0) | 3y E S such that {y\,y2) > (-^i^ ^^)-Then T contains S, and the strict Pareto surface of T is identical to the strict Pareto surface of S.
Suppose that/(7") = z is not an element of the strict Pareto surface of T. Then there exists an element / of T such that / ^ z and (/,, t^ > (Z|, z^. Let a = zjt^ and b = zjtj. Then («, h) < (1. I), and (a, h) ^ (1. 1).
The set T' = {{ax,, bxj) | (x^, x^) e 7'} is contained in T, and T' contains the point z, since z={at^,bt2).
So Condition 2 implies /(7"') ^/ ( T ) = z. But Condition 1 implies f(T') = {az^. hzj) + z. This contradiction demonstrates that z is an element of the strict Pareto surface of T. But since T and S share the same strict Pareto surface, z is an element of S. So Condition 2 implies/(5') == f{T) = 2, and the Lemma is proved.
The proof of the Theorem is now immediate, since the Lemma implies that/obeys Condition 4, so that Nash's Theorem applies. (The result does not depend on the number of players being 2.) Note, however, thai Pareto optimaiity neither implies nor is implied by individual rationality.
•^The usual form of an individual rationality requirement allows/(S) = (0, 0). So long as the function/is not permitted to be identically equal to the origin, our main theorem continues to hold. However, the lemma used in the proof, which is of interest in its own right, would no longer hold.
